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COMMENT
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OF
UNITED STATES FORCES IN EUROPE
INTRODUCTION
Following World War II, the new international political re-
ality of Western collective security under the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO)1 resulted in the stationing of large
numbers of American troops in NATO countries. It became nec-
essary to determine the rights and duties of Americans stationed
in NATO countries. The Agreement between the Parties to the
North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of their Forces2 was
formed for this purpose. This agreement is a multilateral, recip-
rocal treaty designed to implement the provisions of the North
Atlantic Treaty.
The NATO-SOFA was signed in London, United Kingdom,
on June 19, 1951, and ratified by the United States Senate on
July 15, 1953, by a 72 to 12 vote.3 The purpose of the agreement
was to establish the terms and conditions that would determine
the rights, duties, privileges and immunities belonging to the
troops of one country when sent into or stationed in the terri-
tory of another country, and both countries are parties to the
agreement.4 The agreement also sought to insure that the pres-
The North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243. This
Agreement lays down certain rights and obligations of the service men of NATO mem-
bers when in the territory of other members, and of the receiving state. 'The following
countries are parties to the Agreement: Belgium Feb. 27, 1953, Canada Aug. 28, 1953,
Denmark May 28, 1955, France Sept. 29, 1952, GDR June 1, 1963, Greece July 26, 1954,
Italy Dec. 22, 1955, Luxembourg Mar. 19, 1954, Netherlands Nov. 18, 1953, Norway Feb.
24, 1953, Portugal Nov. 22, 1955, Spain Aug. 10, 1987, Turkey May 18, 1954, United
Kingdom May 13, 1954, and the United States July 24, 1953. Id.
June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, 199 U.N.T.S. 67 [hereinafter NATO-SOFA].
See 99 CONG. REc. 9,088 (1953).
4 Edward D. Re, The Nato Status of Forces Agreement and International Law, 50
1
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ence of friendly troops on foreign soil would be accompanied by
all possible goodwill and preserve the friendly relations among
the NATO allies.5
This article analyzes the criminal jurisdiction provisions of
the NATO - SOFA, Article VII. Part I begins with a discussion
of United States Supreme Court decisions regarding the status
of military forces under international law. This section will con-
clude with a discussion of the development of the European un-
derstanding of the status of forces under international law,
which manifested itself in the Brussels agreement and later
NATO-SOFA. Part II provides an analysis of Article VII, dis-
cussing the issues of jurisdiction, waiver and the rights of the
accused. Part III offers suggestions for changes to Article VII to
better enable the agreement to accomplish its objectives.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATUS OF FORCES LAW
A. International Law Prior to NATO-SOFA
Prior to NATO-SOFA, jurisdiction in the absence of a
treaty was not uniform. Two general principles of international
jurisdiction have developed over the years, each of which works
at cross-purposes with the other. The first principle, the law of
the flag," is a theory supported by more influential nations such
as the United States. The second principle, the territorial sover-
eignty doctrine, is the principle of the occupied. The conflict
between these two competing principles is pervasive throughout
any jurisdictional analysis, in particular the status of military
forces under international law.
During the July 15, 1953 Senate debate, American legal
scholars placed great emphasis on Article VII of the agreement.'
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the issue of
the status of military forces of friendly foreign troops in
NW. U. L. REV. 349 (1955).
5 James S. Fraser, Some Thoughts on Status of Forces Agreements, 3 CONN. L. REV.
335, 337 (1971).
' Serge Lazareff, STATUS OF MILITARY FORCES UNDER CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW,
11(1971).
Id. at 17.
' This focus is manifested by the introduction of the Bricker Amendment. See infra
note 22.
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Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon9 This famous case involved
an action filed in the United States District Court by American
citizens who claimed to be former owners of the schooner "Ex-
change", a vessel allegedly seized by the French government and
converted into a ship of war. 10 In Schooner, Chief Justice Mar-
shall established the rule that although the jurisdiction of a na-
tion within its own boundaries is absolute and only circum-
scribed by limits it so decides to place,1" a country is implied to
waive the exercise of its jurisdiction when it allows foreign
troops to pass through its boundaries.'" This implied consent is
given by the country unless such country expressly conditions
the deployment of such troops to certain terms.
This opinion was referred to sixty years later in Coleman v.
Tennessee."3 In this case, the United States Supreme Court ex-
panded the scope of the Schooner holding, by stating "[i]t is
• 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)'116 (1812).
0 Id.
1 Id. at 136.
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive
and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restric-
tion upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution
of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sover-
eignty to the same extent in that power which could impose such restriction.
All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its
own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can
flow from no other legitimate source. This consent may be either express or im-
plied. In the latter case, it is less determinate, exposed more to the uncertainties
of construction; but, if understood, not less obligatory.
Id.
Id. at 139.
•.. [A] sovereign is understood to cede a portion of his territorial jurisdiction...
where he allows the troops of a foreign prince to pass through his dominions.
In such case, without any express declaration waiving jurisdiction over the army
to which this right of passage has been granted, the sovereign who should attempt
to exercise it would certainly be considered as violating his faith. By exercising it,
the purpose for which the free passage was granted would be defeated, and a por-
tion of the military force of a foreign independent nation would be diverted from
those national objects and duties to which it was applicable, and would be with-
drawn from the control of the sovereign whose power and whose safety might
greatly depend on retaining the exclusive command and disposition of this force.
The grant of a free passage therefore implies a waiver of all jurisdiction over the
troops during their passage, and permits the foreign general to use that discipline,
and to inflict those punishments which the government of his army may require.
Id. at 139-40.
13 97 U.S. 509, 516 (1879).
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well settled that a foreign army permitted to march through a
friendly country, or to be stationed in it, by permission of its
government or sovereign, is exempt from civil and criminal juris-
diction of the place."14 Thus, Coleman expanded the Schooner
holding to troops stationed in the host nation as well as to
troops passing through the host nation. This is significant be-
cause for the first time troops passing through a nation and
troops permanently stationed in a host nation were to be treated
the same.
The last Supreme Court decision, prior to NATO-SOFA, re-
garding the status of forces was Tucker v. Alexandroff.'5 In
Tucker, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the line of cases handed
down from Schooner and Coleman, but recognized the impor-
tance of maintaining military discipline. 16 In the Tucker case, a
detachment of the Imperial Russian Navy, with the consent of
the United States, entered the United States for the purpose of
manning a vessel that had been built in the United States for
the Russian Navy.1" Pursuant to a treaty provision," the Su-
preme Court held that the commanding officer of the Russian
detachment was entitled to have a deserter arrested and re-
turned to his control. Justice Brown stated, "[I]f foreign troops
are permitted to enter, or cross our territory, they are still sub-
ject to the control of their officers and exempt from local juris-
diction."'" This opinion recognizes that maintaining military dis-
cipline is one of the major justifications for the law of the flag
doctrine.20
At the same time, however, Tucker also adheres to the par-
tial contradictory line of decisions set forth by Schooner. Tucker
is generally cited for its statement concerning the holding of
Schooner, which reads as follows:
[The Schooner Exchange,] however, only holds that the pub-
lic armed vessels of a foreign nation may, upon principles of com-
" Id. at 515.
" 183 U.S. 424 (1902).
16 Id.
17 Id.
Is Treaty of Navigation and Commerce, Dec. 18, 1832, U.S.- U.S.S.R, art. IX, 8 Stat.
444-53.
' Tucker, 183 U.S. at 433.
20 Tucker, 183 U.S. at 424.
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ity, enter our harbors with the presumed license of the govern-
ment, and while they are exempt from the jurisdiction of the local
courts; and, by parity of reasoning, that, if foreign troops are per-
mitted to enter, or cross our territory, they are still, subject to the
control of their officers and exempt from local jurisdiction.2 1
Thus, friendly troops outside the scope of their military mission,
such as naval troops in a port of call, are exempt from jurisdic-
tion if they disembark. This is a significant recognition of the
law of the flag doctrine, where the high court recognizes such a
doctrine to the detriment of the American exercise of
jurisdiction.
In conclusion, the United States Supreme Court has de-
cided that nations can bargain for jurisdiction regarding their
respective forces. The United States, being a nation of great in-
ternational presence, favors the doctrine of the law of the flag.
However, this doctrine is not universal and as a result, American
concern for the rights of its servicemen abroad has intensified.
Thus, American policy of attainment of jurisdiction, regardless
of the circumstances, lies deep within American interests."
B. The Development of the Treaty of Brussels
The European development of international law regarding
the status of military forces is unique. Throughout its evolution,
developing law can be identified according to the historical con-
text of the significant era: The first era is the World War I pe-
" Id. at 433.
2 Evidence of the great American concern for the rights of American servicemen is
evident in the proposed Bricker Amendment. 99 CONG. REc. 9080 (daily ed. July 14,
1953) (statement of Sen. Bricker). Many Americans believed at this time that the rule of
international law as laid down by Chief Justice John Marshall is that friendly troops
stationed in a host nation are not subject to the local laws and regulations of the host
country, but are subject only to their own country's laws. 99 CONG. REc. 4818; 4819 (daily
ed. May 7, 1953). Thus they believed that the United States was giving rights away and
compromising where it need not. Senator Bricker proposed the following amendment:
The military authorities of the United States as a sending state shall have exclu-
sive jurisdiction over the members of its force or civilian component and their
dependents with respect to all offenses committed within the territory of the re-
ceiving state and the United States as a receiving state shall, at the request of a
sending state, waive any jurisdiction which it might possess over the members of a
force of civilian component of a sending state and their dependents with respect
to all offenses committed within the territory of the United States.
Id. The Bricker amendment was rejected 53-27. 99 CONG. REc. 9080, 9083.
1992]
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riod, the second is the World War II period, and the third is the
current post World War II period. 23
1. World War I Era
The principle of the law of the flag predominated agree-
ments made during the first world war. Jurisdictional power
could not "be separated from the exercise of disciplinary power,
which is an essential part of military organization" and effective-
ness.24 During this time, France concluded agreements with her
allies pursuant to which the military courts of the allied nations
were given an exclusive jurisdiction for offenses committed by
members of their armed forces.25
During time of war, jurisdiction of an occupying force is
completely independent of the constitution and laws of the occu-
pied country.2" This tenet greatly influenced the agreements of
this era. The World War I agreements were designed to cope
with a situation involving an army of occupation by consent.27
The Allied troop deployment was similar to an occupying force
in their zones of operation.28 The context of the agreements
must be considered in light of the circumstances of the period.
In this era, dominance of the law of the flag doctrine was preva-
lent.2 9 The allied nations were given jurisdiction as if they were
an occupying force. In fact, within the zones of operation of the
respective allied countries, such allied forces not only had re-
tained jurisdiction over their own forces, but also over the civil-
13 LAZAREFF, supra, note 6, at 19.
24 Id.
" Re, supra note 4, at 383. See also G.P. Barton, Foreign Armed Forces: Immunity
From Supervisory Jurisdiction, 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT'T L. 380 (1949) ; G.P. Barton, Foreign
Armed Forces: Immunity From Criminal Jurisdiction, 27 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L. L. 186, 187-94
(1950) [hereinafter Barton]; Archibald King, Jurisdiction Over Friendly Foreign Armed
Forces, 36 AM. J. INT'L L. 539 (1942).
29 Id.
27 A representative agreement during this period was the Franco-Belgium Agree-
ment of August 14, 1914. A key provision of this agreement was that "every force retains
its jurisdiction as to the offenses liable to bring prejudice to it, whatever territory it is
stationed on, and whatever the nationality of the offender." See also Franco-American
Agreement of Jan. 14, 1918, which also demonstrates the principle of law of the flag.
LAZAREFF, supra note 6, at 20.
22 A major portion of the allied forces were located in France and Belgium of com-
paratively narrow and well-defined zones of operations. Barton, supra note 25, at 193.
22 Re, supra note 4, at 384.
[Vol. 4:189
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ians in those areas. 30
Although the law of the flag predominated during this pe-
riod, it was not the only basis for European agreements. The
United Kingdom demanded that the principle of territorial sov-
ereignty be recognized in that country."1 The British government
insisted, as early as September 1917, that the only rights of ju-
risdiction which could be granted to the American forces would
relate to the offenses committed within American military estab-
lishments. 2 The United States refused to accept these demands
and, in response, the British government promulgated the Regu-
lation under the Defense Realm Act, on March 22, 1918.13 This
act read:
the Naval and military authorities and ports of an ally may exer-
cise in relation to the members of any naval or military force of
that ally, who for the time being be in the United Kingdom, all
such powers as are conferred on them by the law of that ally. 4
Despite these concessions, the United States refused to recog-
nize the United Kingdom's claim to territorial sovereignty. 5
The importance of whether the crime is committed within
or outside the zone of operation is important in the analysis of
this era. The assertion could be made that crimes committed
outside of these zones are under the jurisdiction of the host na-
tion. The negotiations between the United Kingdom and Italy
fortify this assertion. Italy recognized the exclusive jurisdiction
of the British service courts in northern Italy within the "zone of
operations. '3 7 "Outside of such zones, however, the Italian
courts also claimed jurisdiction to try British soldiers who com-
mitted offenses against Italian Law."' 38 Thus, this period of the
law's development focuses jurisdictional questions around geog-
raphy. World War I was the first time a nation found itself with
large numbers of friendly troops situated within its borders. The
SO Re, supra note 4, at 384.
LAZAREFF, supra note 6, at 21.
2 d.
3 Id.
Id. (quoting Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, supp. 2, at 733-60).
" Id.
36 Barton, supra note 25, at 192.
Re, supra note 4, at 385.
38 Id.
1992]
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answer, as historian G.P. Barton asserted, was to combine the
law of the flag with a geographical limitation."9
2. World War II Era
The Second World War presented new challenges to the
laws of the status of military forces. The static lines and trench
warfare had given way to a new kind of warfare. Prior to D-Day,
allied troops were scattered throughout the United Kingdom.
The motorization of the forces had increased the rhythm of their
movement.4" As a result, Allied troops mixed with the popula-
tion, using public roads and consuming local goods and ser-
vices.41 Their presence raised a unique set of legal questions
never before addressed.42 In response. to this, the British
adopted the Allied Forces Act.4 3
The Allied Forces Act gave jurisdiction to the allied military
courts for questions of discipline and administration, regarding
members of forces where offenses were punishable under both
the law of the receiving state and under the sending state. Such
cases were of concurrent jurisdiction.4 In contrast, violent
crimes, such as murder and rape, were subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the British courts.45 The Allied Forces Act was
the basis for all of the subsequent agreements the British en-
tered into with allied nations.46
One such agreement was the Anglo-Czech Agreement of Oc-
tober 25, 1940.47 This agreement was a typical agreement that
the United Kingdom entered into with various governments in
exile. The agreement did not provide for jurisdictional immunity
as called for by the law of the flag. For example, Article 2 of the
Anglo-Czechoslovak agreement provided that acts or omissions
constituting offenses against the law of the United Kingdom
so Id.
40 LAZAREFF, supra note 6, at 23-24.
"' Id. at 24.
42 Id.
"a Allied Forces Act, 1940. 3 4 Geo. 6, ch. 5.
14 Id. See Lazareff, supra note 6, at 24.
4' Allied Forces Act, 1940, 3 4 Geo. 6, ch. 5. See LAZAREFF, supra note 23, at 24.
4' LAZAREFF, supra note 6 at 24.
41 Anglo-Czechoslovak Agreement, October 25, 1940, (Great Britain-
Czechoslovakia).
[Vol. 4:189
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shall be liable and tried by the civil courts in the United King-
dom.48 Even offenses which are offenses against military disci-
pline are subject to concurrent jurisdiction if they involve a local
law.4e This is a departure from the practice followed in World
War I and from the law of the flag doctrine, although, during
World War I, the United Kingdom was one of the few territorial
sovereignty advocates in the European community.
In 1942, American forces arrived in the United Kingdom. In
accordance with its traditional policy, the American government
sought exclusive jurisdiction over its forces. In light of the war-
time situation and the great need for American troops, the Brit-
ish government made an exception to its doctrine and agreed to
allow American jurisdiction over its own troops.50 This conces-
sion was manifested by the British in its enacted law: The
United States of America Visiting Forces Act." The American
forces were the only forces enjoying a complete immunity from
jurisdiction by the United Kingdom.2 Surely, the British gov-
ernment considered this a great departure from the traditional
system and practice of the United Kingdom."3 Barton asserts,
from reading the British notes and the debates in both Houses
of Parliament, that these arrangements were temporary and ex-
ceptional, dictated by the conditions of war and tolerated only
because of the mutual feelings of comradeship between the con-
tracting parties."
40 Id., art. 2.
49 For example, an assault on a fellow soldier of the same nationality could also be
punishable under British law. Anglo-Czechoslovak Agreement, October 25, 1940, art. 1.
Barton, supra note 25, at 199.
Visiting Forces Act, 1942, 5 6 Geo. 6, ch. 315.
82 Id. Norman Bentwich, The United States of America Visiting Forces Act, 1942, 6
MoD. L. REV. 68, 72 (1942); Egon Schwelb, The Status of United States Forces in Eng-
lish Law, 38 AM. J. INT'L L. 50, 53 (1944).
" Bentwich, Supra, note 52, at 68, 70-72; Re, supra note 4, at 387.
The British public had demonstrated uneasiness about the matter of jurisdiction.
The British were afraid that American soldiers who committed crimes against
British subjects would not be punished enough. This fear proved unwarranted,
since American military law punished for violent crimes with greater severity.
Re, supra note 4, at 387.
" Barton, supra note 25, at 200:
Despite the British belief that the United States of America Visiting Forces Act
was to be temporary, it would later serve as the model for later agreements be-
tween the United States and some of Britain's other allies. The NATO-SOFA is
one such agreement.
1992]
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3. Post World War II Agreements
The end of hostilities did not bring about the withdrawal of
all the foreign forces stationed in Europe as had been the case in
prior European conflicts." The Western European nations were
faced with the jurisdictional question of friendly foreign forces
without the necessities of war. On March 17, 1948, the Treaty of
Brussels was signed."s This was the first manifestation of the
European states' desire to organize close co-operation with re-
gard to judicial resolution of legal conflicts. s7 Belgium, France,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom are par-
ties to the Treaty of Brussels."
This multilateral agreement parallels NATO-SOFA. The
56 LAZAREFF, supra note 6, at 30. The post World War II agreements can be divided
into three classifications, differentiated by the manner in which jurisdiction is provided
for the sending state. These classifications are exclusive jurisdiction, geographical repar-
tition and concurrent jurisdiction. Id. at 38.
Exclusive jurisdiction is seldom used in the post World War II period. Few host
nations grant exclusive jurisdiction to a sending state over sending state troops deployed
within its territory. In the early 1950's, the United States entered into such agreements
with Korea, Ethiopia and Japan. Id. at 38. However, the political situation was such that
these nations had no other choice.
Geographical repartition is used outside the European continent in mainly third
world countries with unusual laws. The American agreement with the Royal Kingdom of
Saudi-Arabia is an example of a bilateral geographical repartition agreement. United
States-Saudi Arabia Agreement, June 18, 1951, T.I.A.S. No. 2290, art. 13.
Article 13 of the American-Saudi agreement provides, "all United States military
personnel members of the mission, and all civilian employees of the mission who are
United States nationals or the nationals of other friendly states and their dependents at
Dhahran Airfield shall obey all applicable laws and regulations of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia." Id. This part of the agreement recognizes the territorial sovereignty of Saudi
Arabia.
Article 13(c)(i) adds the jurisdictional aspect of the agreement: "any member of the
armed forces of the United States [who] commits an offense inside Dhahran Airfield will
be subject to United States military jurisdiction." Thus, the confining of military service-
men to a specific area is similar to the situation during World War I. This similarity
leads to a similar jurisdictional arrangement even today.
Concurrent jurisdiction is the most common post World War II agreement arrange-
ment and a favorite of the European community. LAZAREFF, supra note 23, at 47. The
NATO-SOFA agreement and the Treaty of Brussels are the only two agreements of this
type. The main characteristic of concurrent jurisdiction is that it is concluded between
states of comparable social and political maturity where the judicial organization and the
legal principles present similar guarantees. LAZAREFF, supra note 23, at 30-56.
Treaty of Brussels
87 LAZAREFF, supra note 6, at 45.
SId.
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Treaty of Brussels recognized that no extensive principle of im-
munity existed.59 This treaty terminated the notion of universal
acceptance of complete immunity for friendly foreign military
forces in host nations. In fact, under the Brussels agreement, the
rise of territorial jurisdiction came to pass. Exclusive jurisdiction
can only rest with the receiving state.60 The Treaty does not pro-
vide for the exclusive jurisdiction of the sending state.6
The new dominance of the receiving state's jurisdiction be-
came evident in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, where an of-
fense was punishable under both the law of the sending state
and the law of the receiving state and both states could legiti-
mately take action. The Treaty of Brussels resolved the jurisdic-
tional conflict in favor of territorial jurisdiction. 2 The Treaty of
Brussels, like the NATO-SOFA, established a system of priori-
ties which assigned jurisdiction to either state depending on the
importance of jurisdiction to either party.
The Treaty of Brussels divided offenses into two categories:
a. Offenses against the law of the Sending State or against
its property, or against a member of the Force to which the of-
fender belonged,
b. All other offenses.6 3
Under subdivision a, the receiving state could prosecute if it
believed that special considerations required it to do so.6 This
creates an ambiguity. Which state defines what those special cir-
cumstances are? It would appear that the receiving state would
have priority, leaving jurisdiction to the sending state only if the
receiving state declined jurisdiction over the offense. Although
waiver is provided in strong terms to the benefit of the sending
state, the waiver provision is not mandatory.6 5 Under subdivi-
sion b, jurisdiction lies solely with the receiving state. Thus, the
Treaty of Brussels represents the new belief that territorial ju-
Treaty of Brussels, art.7, subd. 2.
The receiving state enjoys an exclusive right of jurisdiction only when the offence
against its law is not punishable under the laws of the sending state. Treaty of Brussels
art. 7, para. 2.
61 LAZAREFF, supra note 6, at 47.
62 Id.
e Treaty of Brussels, art. VII, para.2.
" LAZAREFF, supra note 6, at 47.
6I d.
19921
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risdiction is a recognized doctrine and makes it evident that the
law of the flag is not universally accepted.
II. CURRENT STATUS OF FORCES LAW IN EUROPE
A. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Status of Forces
Agreement and Jurisdiction
The NATO-SOFA is based on concurrent jurisdiction for
most situations. When jurisdiction is concurrent, the primary
right to exercise jurisdiction is given to either the sending or the
receiving state, depending upon the type of offense and the cir-
cumstances in which the offense was committed.6 Article VII
delineates the method of determining whether the sending state
or the receiving state shall have either exclusive or concurrent
jurisdiction to try offenders.6
In cases of concurrent jurisdiction, Article VII prescribes
which state obtains the primary right to act. 8 Concurrent juris-
diction arises when both states punish, by law, acts of the of-
fender.8 9 Since both states have a right to prosecute for the same
offense, Article VII provides a method whereby one state re-
ceives the primary right to try the case and the other state steps
aside. In contrast, exclusive jurisdiction, under NATO-SOFA,
implies that only one state has the right to try the offender be-
cause the offense only violates the laws of that country.0
Article VII sets forth the respective criminal jurisdiction for
the sending and the receiving states. 1 Paragraph I of Article VII
" See NATO-SOFA, supra note 2, at art. VII, paras. 1, 3.
67 Id. at art. VII, para. 1.
" Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at art. VII, para. 2.
" 1. Subject to the provisions of this Article,
(a) the military authorities of the sending State shall have the right to exercise
within the receiving State all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on
them by the law of the sending State over all persons subject to the military law of
that State;
(b) the authorities of the receiving State shall have jurisdiction over the members
of a force or civilian component and their dependents with respect to offences
committed within the territory of the receiving State and punishable by the law of
that State.
2-(a) The military authorities of the sending State shall have the right to exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over persons subject to the military law of that State with
[Vol. 4:189
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provides for concurrent jurisdiction.7 2 Without this section, diffi-
culties would arise. Due to the responsibility of a military com-
mand for the maintenance of discipline, and according to the
principle of the law of the flag, the sending state has an interest
in and the authority to try the case. The receiving state, as the
territorial sovereign, is equally competent to prosecute an of-
fense against its public order. To achieve these ends of managing
the legitimate rights of both parties to the agreement, Article
VII provides a system of priorities, as spelled out in paragraph 3
of Article VII.7
3
According to Article VII paragraph 3(a), the sending state
has the primary right to exercise jurisdiction when the offense is
solely against its personnel or property, or when the offense has
been committed in the performance of official duty. 4 The re-
ceiving state has primary jurisdiction in all other cases.7
Primary jurisdiction in concurrent cases for the sending
state thus falls into two categories. In the first case, the receiving
respect to offences, including offences relating to its security, punishable by the
law of the sending State, but not by the law of the receiving State.
(b) The authorities of the receiving State shall have the right to exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over members of a force or civilian component and their dependents
with respect to offences, including offences relating to the security of that State,
punishable by its law but not by the law of the sending State.
(c) For the purposes of this paragraph and of paragraph 3 of this Article a security
offence against a State shall include
(i) treason against the State;
(ii) sabotage, espionage or violation of any law relating to official secrets of that
State, or secrets relating to the national defence of that State.
3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent the following rules
shall apply:
(a) The military authorities of the sending State shall have the primary right to
exercise jurisdiction over a member of a force or of a civilian component in rela-
tion to
(i) offences solely against the property or security of that State, or offences solely
against the person or property of another member of the force or civilian compo-
nent of that State or of a dependent;
(ii) offences arising out of any act or omission done in the performance of official
duty.
(b) In the case of any other offence the authorities of the receiving State shall
have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction.
Id. at art. VII, paras. 1-2, 3(a),(b).
7 Id. at art. VII, para. 1.
7 Id. at art. VII, para. 3.
, Id. at art. VII, para. 3(a).
76 Id. at art. VII, para. 3(b).
13
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state's interest is minimal because neither its nationals nor its
territory have been violated. In this instance, only the sending
state has an interest and the right to choose whether to prose-
cute an offender. The second category is probably the most con-
troversial section and has led to the most discord. The issue here
is what constitutes an act or omission done in the performance
of official duty.
The principle holding that the local courts of the receiving
state are not competent to try foreign servicemen committed in
the performance of official duty is well established.7" The ser-
viceman, in the performance of official duty, is carrying out in-
structions that he has received from the sending state, which
may not be before the court of the receiving state." Therefore,
the sending state is not confronted with the problem of answer-
ing to the courts of the receiving state for the orders given to the
serviceman offender. This is the full import of paragraph (c)(ii)
of paragraph 2 of Article VII.
Differences arise in the application of this section. Para-
graph 3(a)(ii) of NATO-SOFA fails to provide any guidance as
to the bounds of official duty. If the sending state determines
official duty, it will make such determinations by its own criteria
and in furtherance of its own policies, because each state has an
interest in exercising jurisdiction to the fillest extent possible.
Accordingly, sending states will define official duty in the
broadest sense and receiving states will define official duty nar-
rowly. Therefore, which state defines official duty is of consider-
able importance. 78
76 LAZAREFF, supra note 6, at 170.
77 Id.
78 The vagueness of what is official duty was recognized in the Working Groups
which formulated the drafts of the NATO-SOFA during its negotiations. In the first
draft official duty was subject exclusively to the sending state's criminal jurisdiction. In
the second and third drafts it was put in the concurrent section, with the sending state
having the primary right to define the term. DR(51)15. During the negotiations, a great
number of representatives believed that scope of duty should be clearly defined. The
Italian delegate felt the act must be "done not only in the performance of official duty,
but also within the limits of such duty." LAZAREFF, supra note 23, at 174. He gave an
example of a driver traveling from one town to another on official business who for per-
sonal reasons deviated from the most direct route. If an accident occurred, this was not
official duty. MS-R(51)14. The Canadian delegate was of the opinion that the act done in
performance of official duty must be "within the duty orders of the person concerned."
LAZAREFF, supra note 23, at 174. The Belgian representative was of the opinion that the
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To fill this void in the agreement, the United States has
generally relied upon ad hoc agreements with the various al-
lies.79 Thus, the outcome of paragraph 3(a)(ii) can be different
depending upon which NATO country is involved. Conse-
quently, serious disputes regarding the definition of official duty
have been avoided. Most nations have agreed to accept a certifi-
cate of the United States authorities as to performance of official
duty."0 In the United Kingdom, the law which implements the
agreement with the United States reads as follows:
Where a person is charged with an offense against United King-
dom law and at the time when the offense is alleged to have been
committed he was a member of a visiting force, a certificate is-
sued by or on behalf of the appropriate authority of the sending
country, stating that the alleged offense, if committed by him,
arose out of and in the course of his duty as a member of that
force or component, as the case may be, shall in any such pro-
ceedings as aforesaid be sufficient evidence of that fact unless the
contrary is proved.8
Thus, the British accept the United States certificate as merely
a presumption that may be rebutted by evidence to the con-
trary. In Turkey, a statute makes the United States certificate
determinative.8 2 In France, a circular of the French Ministry of
Justice provides that the determination of the sending state will
sending state should not have primary right to exercise jurisdiction in any case if a na-
tional of the receiving state was involved, even if the offense occurred in the performance
of official duty. MS(J)R(51)2.
The documents of the "travaux preparatoires" are the following: Minutes of the
Working Group MSR(51)1-26; Documents of the Working Group MS-D(51)1-34; Min-
utes of the Juridical Sub-committee MS(J)R(51)1-9. The "Travaux Preparatoires" of the
NATO-SOFA have been published under the title of "International Law Studies 1961,"
U.S. Naval War College.
Thus, two sides can be demonstrated. The adherents of national sovereignty, e.g.,
the French and Belgians, sought a precise definition of the concept of official duty. The
more precise definition leaves less discretion to the sending state in determining, accord-
ing to its own criteria, whether an act or omission was done in the performance of official
duty. Opposing this view, the U.S. representative was adherent to the law of the flag, and
consistently opposed any precise definition of official duty, claiming such right for the
sending state alone. LAZAREFF, supra note 23, at 174-177.
" I The Law of the Peace, Dept. of the Army, Pam. 27-161-1, at 10-8 (1979) [here-
inafter Law of the Peace].
80 Id.
" Visiting Forces Act of 1952, para. 11(4).
" Turkish Law no. 68-76 (1956).
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be accepted as conclusive if it is rendered by a staff judge advo-
cate or legal officer. 83 The German resolution of this conflict
takes a middle approach of the various examples. Article 18 of
the Supplementary Agreement of August 1959 provides:
1. Whenever, in the course of criminal proceedings against a
member of a force or of a civilian component, it becomes neces-
sary to determine whether an offence has arisen out of any act or
omission done in the performance of official duty, such determi-
nation shall be made in accordance with the law of the sending
State concerned. The highest appropriate authority of such send-
ing State may submit to the German court or authority dealing
with the case a certificate thereon.
2. The German court or authority shall make its decision in con-
formity with the certificate. In exceptional cases, however, such
certificate may, at the request of the German court or authority,
be made the subject of review through discussions between the
Federal Government and the diplomatic mission in the Federal
Republic of the sending State.8 4
This procedure makes the certificate determinative but al-
lows questions to be asked. These questions, however, are left to
diplomatic channels.85 Article VII, paragraph 3(a)(ii) of NATO-
SOFA allows jurisdiction to be different depending on how the
states have agreed to sort out this ambiguity. Receiving state ac-
ceptance of the United States certificate ranges from prima facie
to determinative.
B. Exclusive Jurisdiction
The sending state, pursuant to Article VII paragraph 2(a) of
NATO-SOFA, has the right to exercise exclusive criminal juris-
diction over persons subject to its military law. This jurisdiction
renders offenses punishable by the law of the sending state, but
not by the law of the receiving state.8 6 The same provision for
the receiving state regarding exclusive criminal jurisdiction does
not provide such limitation. The treaty clearly provides that ex-
18 LAZAREFF, supra note 6, at 181.
84 Id.
88 Id.
"6 NATO-SOFA, supra note 2, at art. VII, para. 2(a).
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clusive criminal jurisdiction rests with the sending state only in
cases of violations by the members of the military force and not
in cases of offenses committed by the civilian components or de-
pendents. It was not the drafters' intent to make United States
laws enforceable in Europe except in a military disciplinary con-
text. 7 This distinction is evident since civilian employees and
dependents are not amenable to military courts and therefore
are excluded from this provision.""
Pursuant to Article VII, paragraph 2(b) of NATO-SOFA,
the receiving state has the right to exercise exclusive criminal
jurisdiction over military employees, civilian employees and de-
pendents, who can be punished by its law but not by the law of
8' Thus for example, the drafters sought to avoid the unnecessary enforcement of
American law in areas beyond its jurisdiction. For example, it is against the law to drive
on the left side of the road in the United States. If an American goes to Europe and
drives on the left side of the road, it is proper according to European law. The treaty
does not provide for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction where no law of the receiving
state has been broken, although, the same conduct would be a crime if done in the send-
ing state.
88 The Supreme Court on three separate occasions has restricted the exclusive juris-
diction of the United States as a sending state by eliminating dependents and United
States civilian employees from the category of "persons subject to the military law" of
the United States.
In Reid v. Covert, Kinsella v. Kruger, 354 U.S. 269 (1957), the Supreme Court re-
jected the idea that when the United States acts against citizens abroad it can do so
without regard for the Bill of Rights. The United States is entirely a creature of its
Constitution. The Court held that all the constitutional safeguards apply to civilian em-
ployees and dependents and consequently in all cases these two groups are not subject to
either military courts or military law. The dissent, by Justice Clark, who later wrote the
majority opinion in Guagliaro and Bohlender, emphasized the importance of trial by the
defendant's own countrymen and made reference to NATO-SOFA, finding that the in-
tent of Congress was to obtain jurisdiction over all members of our forces, including
civilian employees and dependents. Justice Clark felt that to decide as the majority did
would frustrate the intent of Congress and actually reduce the scope of the United States
jurisdiction over its nationals abroad.
Three years later in McElory v. Guagliaro, Wilson v. Bohlender, 361 U.S. 281 (1960),
the Supreme Court held that civilian employees of overseas military forces were not sub-
ject to court-martial jurisdiction for non-capital offenses. The Court reasoned that a ci-
vilian, entitled by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution to trial by jury, cannot
constitutionally be made liable to the military law and jurisdiction in time of peace.
In the same year in Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960), the Supreme Court held
that the Army's treatment of dependents and civilian employees for court-martial ame-
nability was unconstitutional.
The result of limiting court-martial status to only capital offenses is a compromise,
which protects United States nationals from possible harsh results of foreign courts
while allowing lesser crimes to be handled by foreign courts.
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the sending state.89 This provision for exclusive criminal juris-
diction is limited by the application of Article 134 of the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).90 This provision reads as
follows:
Though not specifically mentioned in this code, all disorders and
neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the
armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the
armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of which per-
sons subject to this code may be guilty, shall be taken cognizance
of by a general or special summary court-martial, according to the
nature and degree of the offense, and punished at the discretion
of such court. 1
The application of this catchall provision makes many viola-
tions of local law a military violation of the UCMJ as well. The
applicability of the UCMJ provision is significant because, if the
offense is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the receiving state,
there is no possibility of securing a waiver of jurisdiction under
Article VII, paragraph 3(c) of NATO-SOFA. If the act is charge-
able under Article 134, however, a waiver of jurisdiction can be
requested and the receiving state must, according to NATO-
SOFA, give it sympathetic consideration."2 Thus, the jurisdiction
of the receiving state can be greatly curtailed by the flexibility of
Article 134 of the UCMJ.
In view of the American policy of reducing the scope of for-
eign jurisdiction over American forces, a broad interpretation of
Article 134 is not undesirable.9 3 The criteria for establishing a
transgression of Article 134 is that the violation of foreign law
must either be a disorder or neglect to the prejudice of good or-
der and discipline or bring discredit upon the armed forces.
94
Merely causing personal injuries as a result of simple negligence
does not automatically constitute an offense under the UCMJ.e5
The most frequent criminal offenses brought against all groups
11 NATO-SOFA, supra note 2, at art. VII, para. 2(b).
1* Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 134.
91 Id.
02 J.Rouse and G. Baldwin, The Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction under The Nato
Status of Forces Agreement, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 29,39 (1987) [hereinafter Rouse].
93 Id.
9' United States v. Eagleson, 11 C.M.R. 893 (1953).
95 United States v. Kirchner, 4 C.M.R. 69 1952).
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of United States personnel involve traffic accidents and charges
related to the damages resulting from such accidents.
The practical use of Article 134 is not clear. The United
States military law recognizes that negligent homicide is an of-
fense violative of either the first or second clause of Article
134.9' It can be logically argued that personal injury of an indi-
vidual resulting from simple negligence, differing from negligent
homicide only by the fortuitous circumstance that the injured
party did not die, likewise constitutes conduct of a nature to
bring discredit upon the armed forces." Thus, an expansive
reading of article 134 of UCMJ can eliminate the receiving
state's exclusive jurisdiction over only the armed forces of the
sending state.
C. Waiver of Jurisdiction by a Party
The effect of waiver by one state of its primary right to ex-
ercise jurisdiction is an important aspect of Article VII. Para-
graph 3(c) of Article VII provides for waiver of jurisdiction. 8
The section reads as follows:
(c) If the State having the primary right decides not to exercise
jurisdiction, it shall notify the authorities of the other State as
soon as practicable. The authorities of the State having the pri-
mary right shall give sympathetic consideration to a request from
the authorities of the other State for a waiver of its right in cases
where that other state considers such waiver to be of particular
importance."
The United States, in order to obtain the broadest possible
jurisdiction, always requests waiver in cases involving individu-
als covered by NATO-SOFA.' ° The significance of this waiver
provision is evidenced by the fact that in a one-year period, be-
96 The court when seeking to define the scope of Article 134 held " we believe that
acts of simple negligence, other than those causing homicide, do not injure the reputa-
tion of the armed forces within the meaning of Article 134." The court went on to hold
that many factors must be considered when weighing the application of Article 134.
United States v. Wolverton, 10 C.M.R. 641, 643 (1953).
" Eagleson, 11 C.M.R. at 897.
" NATO-SOFA, supra note 2, at para. 3(c).
99 Id.
.00 Note, Criminal Jurisdiction over American Armed Forces Abroad, 70 HARv. L.
REV. 1043, 1061 (1957).
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tween December 1, 1954, and November 30, 1955, in the North
Atlantic Treaty area, a waiver of local jurisdiction was obtained
in 2,840 cases, representing more than half the offenses subject
to foreign jurisdiction. 10 ' The Department of Defense has re-
ported that the Army secured waiver of jurisdiction in over
eighty-three percent of the offenses subject to the jurisdiction of
NATO countries. 10 2 This high percentage of waivers is due in
great measure to the good will between member nations in using
informal as well as formal methods in securing waiver of
jurisdiction.103
The ambiguity that arises from the waiver of criminal juris-
diction results from its effect on the rights of the respective
states, rather than from how it is obtained. Once a waiver is
sought and granted, can the nation that waived its right to juris-
diction get it back, if the state obtaining waiver later takes no
action on the case? In view of the American policy to obtain
101 Letter dated October 12th, 1954 written by Mr. Struve Hensel of the Depart-
ment of Defense to Senator Saltonstall. Reprinted in Re, supra note 4, at 356.
Mr. Hensel summarizes the report as follows:
During this period, throughout the world, there were 3,787 offenses committed
by personnel of the Army, Navy and Air Force and by persons associated with
those forces which were subject to the jurisdiction of foreign courts. In 2,987 or
77% of these cases, the foreign authorities waived their jurisdiction. 627 cases
were tried by the local courts, and these proceedings resulted in 77 sentences to
confinement, of which 44 were subsequently suspended. Thus, in only 9/10 of 1%
of cases subject to the jurisdiction of foreign courts were individuals forced to
serve terms of confinement in foreign prisons.
In countries which are parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, including both na-
tions which had ratified the NATO Status of Forces Agreement and those which
had not, there were 1761 offenses committed which could have been tried in for-
eign courts. Waivers of jurisdiction were granted in 1259 or 70.5% of the cases.
384 individuals were tried in the courts of NATO Countries, and 45 received
sentences to confinement, which were suspended in all but 20 of these cases (1.1%
of all cases subject to the jurisdiction of NATO States).
Id. In this letter, Mr. Hensel adds:
I believe that these statistics demonstrate that those countries in which United
States forces are stationed are exercising their jurisdiction with discretion and in a
spirit of cooperation. I believe that it is also important to emphasize that the De-
partment of Defenses has received no reports for this period of any proceeding
under the NATO Status of Forces Agreement in which the individual has been
deprived of constitutional safeguards he would have enjoyed had he been tried in
the United States.
102 Hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.J. Res. 309, 84th
Cong., 1st (and 2nd) Sess., Pt. 1 (1956), p. 572.
103 Rouse, supra note 92, at 46.
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waiver in every case, the occurrence of non-prosecution is likely.
One NATO member has faced this issue and has answered
it in its courts. In November 1983, Major Whitley, an Air Force
officer stationed in France, suffered a blowout while driving
home from Paris where he had attended a social function.10 4 His
passenger was a Canadian Air Force major, Squadron leader
Aitchison.105 Whitley lost control of his vehicle, which was
thrown against a tree, killing the Canadian officer.106 Whitley
sustained only bruises.107
Pursuant to a request of Air Force authorities, the public
prosecutor agreed to waive French jurisdiction over the inci-
dent.'0 8 An informal Air Force investigation, not conducted
under Article 32 of the UCMJ, concluded that the evidence was
insufficient to warrant court-martial charges against Major
Whitley for the death of the Canadian officer.109
Aitchison left a widow, whom Whitley's insurance company
refused to compensate, claiming a third party was responsible. 110
The widow, who under Canadian law could receive no pension if
the husband was not killed while on duty, therefore initiated a
mixed civil/criminal action in accordance with the French judi-
cial system based on civil law.1 ' Aitchison's widow raised the
issue of the French prosecutor's initial waiver of jurisdiction." 2
The Tribunal Correctionnel of Corbeil held that a waiver is
not irrevocable, and that since the United States did not try Ma-
jor Whitley for his alleged offense, the French court could try
him without securing a waiver from the United States."' The
Tribunal Correctionnel's sentence, as affirmed by the Cour
d'Appel of Paris, was one month's imprisonment and a 50,000
I" Aitchision v. Whitley, Corbeil Criminal Court, April 5, 1954; Paris Court of Ap-
peals, 12th Chamber, May 16, 1956; Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, March 25,
1958. Construed in LAZAREFF, supra note 23, at 200-03; Edwin G. Schuck, Concurrent
Jurisdiction under the NATO Status of Forces Agreement. 57 COL: L. REV. 355, 357-58
(1957).
106 Schuck, supra note 104, at 357.
106 Id.
107 LAZAREFF, supra note 6, at 200.
108 Schuck, supra note 104, at 357.
10' Id. at 358-59.
H LAZAREFF, supra note 6, at 201.
ll Id.
11# Id.
"' LAZAREFF, supra note 6, at 204.
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franc fine.1 1 4
Major Whitley appealed to the Cour de Cassation. 15 The
Cour de Cassation annulled the judgment against Major
Whitley."'6 The basis of the French court's decision was that the
waiver pursuant to Article VII 3(c) of NATO was final and bind-
ing.' 17 It held that subsequent prosecution is a separate issue of
waiver. 1 " The court further held that the United States must
expressly waive jurisdiction if the French courts are to have the
right to try the case again.119 Thus, waiver is a complete relin-
quishment of the right to exercise jurisdiction.
D. Rights of the Accused
The overriding concern of today's American policy-makers,
as at the inception of NATO-SOFA, is the protection of the con-
stitutional rights of American servicemen. Paragraphs 8 and 9 of
NATO-SOFA's Article VII reflect this concern.120 Jurisdiction is
withheld from the receiving state if the guidelines of paragraphs
8 and 9 are not adhered to. Paragraph 8 of Article VII provides:
8. Where an accused has been tried in accordance with the provi-
sions of this Article by the authorities of one Contracting Party
and has been acquitted, or has been convicted and is serving, or
has served, his sentence or has been pardoned, he may not be
tried again for the same offence within the same territory by the
authorities of another Contracting Party. However, nothing in
this paragraph shall prevent the military authorities of the send-
ing State from trying a member of its force for any violation of
rules of discipline arising from an act or omission which consti-
tuted an offense for which he was tried by the authorities of an-
other Contracting Party.121
It is important to note in the first clause of paragraph 8 that
the accused must have been tried in accordance with the provi,
sion of Article VII. Consequently, for the accused to escape a
... Schuck, supra note 104, at 359.
115 LAZAREFF, supra note 6, at 205.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 208.
Ile Id.
120 NATO-SOFA, supra note 2, at art. VII, paras. 8, 9.
121 NATO-SOFA, supra note 2, at art. VII, para. 8.
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second trial, the first trial must have been by the state with the
right to exercise jurisdiction.
There have been cases where an accused was tried by one
state, where the other state had the exclusive or primary right to
exercise jurisdiction. 22 This was the situation that faced the
Cour de Cassation, 23 where an American serviceman had been
prosecuted before a French court for the offense of driving his
automobile in a reckless manner.124 The serviceman was con-
victed, although he pleaded double jeopardy, as he had already
been punished by the American military authorities by reduc-
tion in grade and withdrawal of his driver's license.
125
The Cour de Cassation held that the offense, for which the
accused was charged, came within the purview of paragraph 3(b)
of Article VII, thus giving the French judicial authorities a prior-
ity to exercise jurisdiction.'12 In addition, the court decided that
the defendant had been convicted by error as the American au-
thorities did not have the primary right of jurisdiction. 2 ' Thus,
the defendant had not been tried in accordance with the provi-
sions of NATO-SOFA and could not invoke paragraph 8, which
specifically provides for the condition of a trial being held in ac-
cordance with the terms of Article VII.1'2 This decision has been
well received in the legal community."19 It avoids a race for the
contracting parties to conduct trials and therefore, in some
cases, uses paragraph 8 to avoid the jurisdictional provisions.
This double jeopardy clause of NATO-SOFA does not pre-
vent a sending state from prosecuting an accused, who has been
tried under the courts of the receiving state. 30 It merely pre-
122 LAZAREFF, supra, note 6 at 231.
12- Jensen Case, Cass. Crim. June 15, 1962, reprinted in LAZAREFF, supra note 6, at
231.
124 LAZAREFF, supra note 6, at 231.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
120 NATO-SOFA, supra note 2, at art.VII, para.8.
This was not the intent of the drafters:
[P]aragraph 8 provides that the prohibition of double prosecution for the same
offense applies only to trial on the same territory. Therefore a serviceman, Ameri-
can for example, tried in France for a particular offence, could be tried again in
the United States by the American authorities. Such a result certainly would not
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vents an individual from being tried again for the same offense,
within the same territory, by the authorities of another con-
tracting party. This provision prevents the receiving state from
committing double jeopardy against the accused while allowing
the sending state to prosecute him upon his arrival to his
home.'
The due process protection of American servicemen is pro-
vided for in Article VII, paragraph 9.132 It would appear that
this provision provides sufficient safeguards to protect United
States servicemen from an unjust trial at the hands of a receiv-
ing state. Yet, there was much debate in the United States Sen-
ate, as to whether American servicemen's rights were adequately
safeguarded.1 33 Prior to the ratification of NATO-SOFA, the
Senate adopted a statement or reservation proposed by its Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations. 3 ' This statement declared that the
Senate had decided the agreement neither diminished nor other-
wise altered the right of the United States to safeguard its secur-
ity by excluding from the United States such persons whose
presence is a danger to the United States.3 '
be in accord with the goals of the drafters of SOFA but the language of the text
does not allow any other interpretation.
LAZAREFF, supra note 6, at 232.
131 NATO-SOFA, supra note 2, at art. VII, para. 8.
132 NATO-SOFA, supra note 2, at art. VII, para. 9. This states:
9. Whenever a member of a force or civilian component or a dependent is prose-
cuted under the jurisdiction of a receiving State he shall be entitled-
(a) to a prompt and speedy trial;
(b) to be informed, in advance of trial, of the specific charge or charges made
against him;
(c) to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
(d) to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favour, if they are
within the jurisdiction of the receiving State;
(e) to have legal representation of his own choice for his defense or to have free or
assisted legal representation under the conditions prevailing for the time being in
the receiving State;
(f) if he considers it necessary, to have the services of a competent interpreter; and
(g) to communicate with a representative of the Government of the sending State
and, when the rules of the court permit, to have such a representative present at
his trial.
13I See 99 CONG. REc. 9081 (daily ed. July 14, 1953), reprinted in Re, supra note 4,
at 360.
134 Re, supra note 4, at 359.
1 Id. This statement was amended to include additional matters:
(1) The criminal jurisdiction provisions of Article VII do not constitute a prece-
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Although these safeguards are, in principle, common to all
NATO countries, ordinary citizens of the sending state, includ-
ing tourists of the State, may not avail themselves of these pro-
visions. The objectives of NATO-SOFA are to define the status
of persons who are on duty in a foreign country and to provide
protection to members of the military forces, civilian compo-
nents, and dependents. 136
Sub-paragraph (a) provides for a prompt and speedy trial.
In its first draft, there appeared in this section the right to a
public and speedy trial.13 7 In the versions that followed, and
even in the final version, only the right to a speedy trial was
retained. The requirement for a public hearing was aban-
doned.138 The main reason for such a change was that states
could not be required to modify their rules of procedure which
may contemplate closed hearings under certain circumstances,
such as cases involving State secrets and cases in which publicity
dent for future agreements;
(2) Where a person subject to the military jurisdiction of the United States is to
be tried by the authorities of a receiving State, under the treaty the Commanding
Officer of the Armed forces of the United States in such state shall examine the
laws of such State with particular reference to the procedural safeguards con-
tained in the Constitution of the United States;
(3) If, in the opinion of such commanding officer, under all the circumstances of
the case, there is danger that the accused will not be protected because of the
absence or denial of constitutional rights he would enjoy in the United States, the
commanding officer shall request the authorities of the receiving state to waive
jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3 (c) of Article VII
(which requires the receiving state to give "sympathetic consideration" to such
request) and if such authorities refuse to waive jurisdiction, the commanding of-
ficer shall request the Department of State to press such request through diplo-
matic channels and notification shall be given by the Executive Branch to the
Armed Services Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives;
(4) A representative of the United States to be appointed by the Chief of Diplo-
matic Mission with the advice of the senior United States military representative
in the receiving state will attend the trial of any such person by the authorities of
a receiving state under the agreement, and any failure to comply with the provi-
sions of paragraph 9 of Article VII of the agreement shall be reported to the com-
manding officer of the armed forces of the United States in such state who shall
then request the Department of State to take appropriate action to protect the
rights of the accused, and notification shall be given by the Executive Branch to
the Armed Service Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives.
See, NATO-SOFA, supra note 2, at 1828.
"e LAZAREFF, supra note 6, at 210.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 211.
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would present a danger for public order or morals.1"9
There is strong motivation by all parties to command a
speedy trial. The United States does not want its servicemen
confined to prison for long periods of time, as is the case some-
times in France, Italy and Turkey.' " The receiving state does
not want to see highly mobile servicemen evade its jurisdiction
by being transferred out of it.
The next provision of the paragraph which has raised some
questions is the accused's right to compel witnesses. This is pro-
vided for in sub-paragraph (d).14' The problem was recognized
early at the Working Sessions, and the first draft provided that
the accused would "have the right of compulsory process for ob-
taining witnesses in his favor". 14 This very broad and absolute
formula would have permitted members of a military force, civil-
ian components and dependents to obtain witnesses in their be-
half, even where citizens of the receiving state do not enjoy a
similar right and where there is no procedure in the receiving
state to compel such witnesses to attend.14 3 This draft was modi-
fied to add "if within the jurisdiction of the receiving State".4
This addition may result in an individual receiving more
rights than he would have under his own nation's laws. Under
the agreement one can still obtain witnesses and compel their
appearance even if the receiving state's procedural laws do not
allow. This question was raised during the Working Sessions.
The conclusion that appears to have been reached by the Judi-
cial Sub Committee was that legislation would have to be
adopted by each of the receiving states in order to compel wit-
nesses to appear before the military tribunals of the sending
139 Id. For example, in Belgium, Article 96 of the Constitution provides that hear-
ings shall be public unless it is dangerous for public order or morals in which event the
court may declare a closed hearing by an order rendered in a public hearing. A closed
hearing may likewise be ordered in the case of a political crime. Identical principles ap-
ply in Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Turkey and the United Kingdom. In Iceland, it is the law that all hearings
before criminal courts are not public except those before the Supreme Court where the
public is admitted. Id.
14 LAZAREFF, supra note 6, at 212.
... NATO-SOFA, supra note 2, at art. IX, para.(d).
141 LAZAREFF, supra note 6, at 216.
143 Id.
144 Id.
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state.
Among all the NATO states, only the United Kingdom and
Canada have passed legislation permitting the military forces to
request the civil authorities of the receiving state to issue sub-
poenas for witnesses who are nationals of that state." British
legislation provides that any civil or military person may be
summoned to appear before the British courts. 14 6 Similar proce-
dures do not exist in France, and thus the sending state must
request cooperation in order to compel witnesses to appear
before its tribunal. 147 Therefore, obtaining witnesses is not diffi-
cult in the civil courts of the receiving state since all NATO
countries have procedural provisions for compelling witnesses.
Difficulty results when the sending state conducts military tribu-
nals in the receiving state and seeks local citizens as witnesses.
Sub-paragraph (g) of paragraph 9 gives the right to an ac-
cused member of the NATO forces, civilian components, or de-
pendents, "to communicate with a representative of the Govern-
ment of the sending State and, when the rules of the court
permit, to have such a representative present at his trial. 1 48 The
development of this section involved several modifications.1 49 In
the earlier drafts of the Working Sessions, a representative was
provided at all stages of the accused's confinement and judicial
process. 5 ° This was eliminated because it was believed to be too
burdensome.1 5 1 The third. and final draft was far more restric-
tive. In this version, an observer is permitted only if the rules of
the court allow. 52 Thus, the instrument which is designed to en-
sure that the rights of servicemen are respected, may be used to
suppress those very rights. An observer is needed to evaluate ob-
jectively the court procedures. The Senate remembered this con-
cern when it added its sense of the agreement to its
145 LAZAREFF, supra note 6, at 217.
146 Visiting Forces Law, Application of Law (S.I. 1954, No. 635.), construed in
LAZAREFF, supra note 23, at 217.
1" Circular no. 53-38 of September 3, 1953, reprinted in Lazareff, supra note 23, at
217.
141 NATO-SOFA, supra note 2, at art. VII, para. 9(g).
149 LAZAREFF, supra note 6, at 222.
Id.
Id.
252 NATO-SOFA, supra note 2, at art. VII, para. 9(g).
19921
27
PACE Y.B. INT'L L.
ratification. 5 '
Paragraph 9 is an important provision of NATO-SOFA.
Without this provision, the ratification of the Treaty by the Sen-
ate would have been doubtful. Many opposed the ratification be-
cause they felt that the rights of United States servicemen were
not adequately protected. The late Senator McCarran was op-
posed to the ratification of the agreement, chiefly because it was
"violative of the rights of American nationals." 151 He indicated
that, although Paragraph 9 of Article VII "looks like a pretty
good list," upon analysis "it becomes apparent that some of the
most important guaranties under our own Bill of Rights have
been omitted from this list."' 55
McCarran observed, among other things, that there were no
provisions guaranteeing a public trial, the privilege against self-
incrimination, freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, the
right to appeal or review a decision, freedom of religion, freedom
of speech and of the press, right of free assembly and petition,
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, and the right
to trial by jury.'56 Apart from the wisdom of inserting a Bill of
Rights in an international treaty of this nature, it should be
noted that some of the rights referred to, such as trial by jury,
would have no application to a serviceman who would ordinarily
be tried by a military court-martial.
CONCLUSION
NATO-SOFA suffers from many ambiguities. Most of these
ambiguities are the result of conflicts over jurisdiction which
were never resolved. Despite these differences, this treaty still
represents an enlightened effort to bridge the differences that
may come about because of the deployment of foreign troops on
friendly soil.
A very difficult problem that has arisen in interpreting
NATO-SOFA arises under the concurrent jurisdiction section.
What is the definition of official duty for Article VII 57 pur-
Re, supra note 4, at 359.
164 99 CONG. REc. 9081 (daily ed. July 14, 1953).
1. Id.
' Id.
NATO-SOFA, supra note 2, at art. VII, 3(A)(ii).
[Vol. 4:189
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol4/iss1/8
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
poses? The inherent conflict of the two opposing interests of the
contracting parties leads to differences over how broad an inter-
pretation may be given to official duty. The agreement should
create an official mechanism to make the official duty determi-
nation. Ad hoc agreements should not be over relied upon.
These Ad hoc agreements will only endure as long as good rela-
tions between the various NATO allies continue. A uniform ap-
proach will ensure that all contracting parties are treated
equally and prevent retaliatory actions regarding the various
definitions of official duty.
NATO-SOFA suffers from other ambiguities as well. The
use of Article 134 by the American military could lead to de-
struction of receiving state exclusive jurisdiction over members
of the sending state forces. This question needs to be answered
in the definitive. The intent of the drafters of NATO-SOFA
could never have been to allow so easy a circumvention of their
design for exclusive jurisdiction. Although it is in the American
national interest to obtain jurisdiction in as many cases as possi-
ble, this agreement was created for the benefit of all and not just
for one contracting member.
The omission of civilian components and dependents from
the jurisdiction of military law brings into question whether it
was the intent of the drafters to exclude these two groups from
the possibility of sending state exclusive jurisdiction. The intent
of the agreement is to define the status of all members of a mili-
tary force, civilian employees and dependents. To treat the vari-
ous groups so differently is not the intent of this agreement.
Most believed that the civilian employees and dependents would
be answerable to United States law. The United States needs to
change its opinion as to the amenability of civilian employees
and dependents to military law. Perhaps these two groups
should be sent back to the United States for trial for crimes
committed in Europe, rather than simply being forgotten as in
some cases under NATO-SOFA.
The protection of servicemen's rights needs to be better as-
sured under NATO-SOFA. The current system only works be-
cause of the common good will currently enjoyed between the
various contracting parties. Paragraph 9 of Article VII is a good
start as Senator McCarran remarked, but many important pro-
tections are not enumerated and thus could be ignored if the
1992]
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receiving state were to so decide. A better incorporation of the
United States Bill of Rights is called for in NATO-SOFA.
The question of waiver, as provided for in Article VII, is an
important one. This agreement was in part created to serve jus-
tice. The victim of crimes should not be forgotten. The Whitley
case demonstrates the possible ways waiver can be used to deny
victims their day in court. The French prosecutor gave up juris-
diction fully expecting proper action would be taken by the
American authorities. Major Whitley was at fault for the acci-
dent which occurred. 15 8 The American failure to adjudicate the
case left Aitchison's widow without a forum. This result should
not have been allowed. Waiver should'be granted on the condi-
tion that appropriate action be taken. This leads to the question
of just how appropriate action is to be defined. This can be eas-
ily delineated by requiring that some form of official action be
taken before a party can simply drop a case. If a case is dropped
the state which had the primary right to exercise jurisdiction
should have a role in making the decision. Conversely, allowing
the United States authorities to dismiss actions with such ease
could lead the authorities of the receiving state to grant waivers
less frequently. This could hurt our relations with our NATO
allies and individuals who really need their case to be waived.
Daniel L. Pagano
"Is LAZAREFF, supra note 6, at 200.
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